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سپاه قدس و گذر از امنیت جمعی به دفاع جمعی در بحران سوریه | ||
| فصلنامه پژوهش های حفاظتی امنیتی | ||
| مقاله 2، دوره 9، شماره 35، آذر 1399، صفحه 35-64 اصل مقاله (7.93 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| نویسنده | ||
| محسن شفیعی سیف آبادی* | ||
| استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علومانسانی و اجتماعی، دانشگاه اردکان، یزد، ایران | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 10 شهریور 1399، تاریخ بازنگری: 24 آبان 1399، تاریخ پذیرش: 21 آذر 1399 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| هدف اصلی مقالهٔ حاضر پردازش چگونگی تغییر مسیر سپاه قدس با فرماندهی سردار قاسم سلیمانی در گذر از «امنیت جمعی» به «دفاع جمعی» در بحران سوریه، بر مبنای الگوی مفهومی «دفاع جمعی» است. سؤال اصلی این جستار این است که «رویکرد سپاه قدس در رویارویی با بحران نظامی‌امنیتی سوریه چگونه بوده است؟» در همین راستا، فرضیه‌ای که به آزمون گذاشته می‌شود، عبارت است از اینکه «سپاه قدس با مدیریت شهید سلیمانی، از تئوری آرمانی امنیت جمعی مد نظر شورای امنیت گذر کرده و با به‌کارگیری شاخصه‌های مهم دفاع جمعی از قبیل برنامه‌ریزی پیشرفته، شناسایی دقیق دشمن، فهم ماهیت تهدید، نظام دفاعی محدود و تشکیل نظام دفاعی از گروه‌ها یا دولت‌های متحد منطقه، نقش بسزایی در تأمین امنیت و تقویت توان نظامی ارتش سوریه داشته است.» نتایج حاصل از تحقیق با روش توصیفی‌تحلیلی، نشان‌دهندهٔ آن است که سپاه قدس با هدایت سردار سلیمانی در بحران سوریه، با اشراف به اینکه ائتلاف‌های بین‌المللی در تقابل با تروریست‌های سوریه، امنیت جمعی را نسبت به منافع سیاسی و اقتصادی خود در اولویت قرار نمی‌دهند؛ در راستای استراتژی دفاع جمعی، اقدام دقیق و پیچیده‌ای را در دستور کار خود قرار داده است. این اقدام‌ها عبارت‌اند از: 1. ائتلاف با دولت‌های محدود و متحد؛ 2. تشکیل بسیج مردمی و واردنمودن انرژی مردم به متن بحران؛ 3. به‌کارگیری استراتژی‌های مهم جنگی بر حسب تجربهٔ نظامی؛ 4. ساماندهی ارتش کلاسیک سوریه؛ 5. راهبری جبههٔ مقاومت و واردنمودن آن‌ها به‌عنوان بازوی کمکی. این رویکرد دفاعی، مشروعیت دولت بشار اسد و امنیت شهروندان سوری را بازتولید و سلفی‌های جهادی را با شکست سنگین مواجه نمود. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| سپاه قدس؛ امنیت جمعی؛ دفاع جمعی؛ سوریه؛ سلفی‌های جهادی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Quds force and transition from collective security to collective defense in the Syria's crisis | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Mohsen Shafiei Seyfabadi | ||
| Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Human and Social Science, Ardakan University, Yazd, Iran. | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| The main purpose of this study is to process how the Quds force with the commandership of general Qāsem Soleimānī changes the direction of Quds force and transits from "collective security" to "collective defense" in Syria's crisis, based on the conceptual model of "collective defense". The main question of this article is "What was the Quds force's approach in dealing with the military- security crisis of Syria?" In this regard, the hypothesis that is being tested is that "the Quds force with the management of martyr Soleimānī, has moved from the ideal theory of collective security considered by the security council and by utilizing important features of collective defense such as advanced planning, accurate identification of the enemy, understanding the nature of threat, the limited defense system and the formation of a defense system from groups or allied governments of region, has played a significant role in ensuring security and strengthening the military capacity of Syria's army." The results of this research that employs descriptive-analytical method show that the Quds force with the management of general Soleimānī in the Syria's crisis, with knowing that international coalitions do not prioritize collective security over their political and economic interests in combating with Syria's terrorists; in line with the collective defense strategy, has put precise and complex measure on his agenda. These measures include: 1. creating coalition with limited and allied governments; 2. forming popular mobilization of people and importing people's energy into the context of the crisis; 3. implementing important war strategies based on military experience; 4. organizing the classical army of Syria; 5. leading the resistance front and importing them as an auxiliary arm. This defensive approach reproduced the legitimacy of the government of Bashar Assad and the security of the Syrian citizens, and severely defeated the Jihadi-Salafis. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Quds force, collective security, collective defense, Syria, Jihadi-Salafis | ||
| مراجع | ||
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ج)تارنما
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