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طراحی یک سامانه فریب همکارانه و مستقل در سامانه دفاع فعال سایبری | ||
پدافند الکترونیکی و سایبری | ||
دوره 10، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 38، مهر 1401، صفحه 129-142 اصل مقاله (1.3 M) | ||
نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
نویسندگان | ||
کوروش داداش تبار احمدی* 1؛ محمد محمودبابویی2 | ||
1استادیار، دانشگاه صنعتی مالک اشتر، تهران، ایران | ||
2دانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد، دانشگاه صنعتی مالک اشتر، تهران، ایران | ||
تاریخ دریافت: 01 شهریور 1400، تاریخ بازنگری: 19 مهر 1400، تاریخ پذیرش: 27 آذر 1400 | ||
چکیده | ||
فناوری فریب سایبری بخشی از فرآیند شناسایی و پاسخگویی به حوادث سایبری است. این فناوری مهاجمان را به سمت داراییهای دروغین IT هدایت کرده تا تهدیدات پیشرفته را شناسایی و تجزیه و تحلیل کند. هشدارهای ایجاد شده در سامانه فریب دارای صحت بالایی است. فریب به روشهای مختلفی صورت میگیرد که رویکرد دفاع فعال از جمله آنهاست. دفاع فعال سایبری مجموعه اقداماتی را دربر میگیرد که ما را در رسیدن به امنیت سایبر هدایت میکند. این اقدامات شامل تشخیص، تجزیه و تحلیل، شناسایی و کاهش تهدیدات نسبت به سامانه و شبکههای ارتباطی در زمان واقعی را شامل میشود. از ابزارهای دفاع فعال میتوان به تله عسل اشاره نمود. تله عسل فریبندهای است که به عمد در شبکه قرار میگیرد تا توسط مهاجم کاوش شود و فعالیتهای انجام گرفته را ثبت، ردیابی و تحلیل نماید. در این تحقیق به نوع کم تعامل آن پرداخته شده است که برای شناسایی فعالیتهای مخرب مورد استفاده قرار میگیرد. با توجه به ابزار و استراتژهای موجود، سامانه دفاع فعال سایبری (سدف سایبری) طراحی شده است تا بهصورت بلادرنگ به مانیتورینگ ناهنجاری رخ داده بپردازد. سدف توانایی تفکیک سطح عملکردی مهاجمین را با توجه به IP دارا است. مباحث مربوط به فریب سایبری و تله عسل بر روی به دام انداختن مهاجم از طریق گمراه کردن، گیج کردن و ... تمرکز دارد. در حقیقت فناوری بهکار رفته در سدف نوع تکامل یافته تله عسل است بدین صورت که قابلیتهای محدود آن را گسترش میدهد. | ||
کلیدواژهها | ||
تله عسل؛ فریب سایبری؛ دفاع فعال سایبری؛ کم تعامل | ||
عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
A cooperative and independent deception system in the active cyber defense system | ||
نویسندگان [English] | ||
Kourosh Dadashtabar Ahmadi1؛ mohammad mahmoudbabouei2 | ||
1Assistant Professor, Malik Ashtar University of Technology, Tehran, Iran | ||
2Master's student, Malik Ashtar University of Technology, Tehran, Iran | ||
چکیده [English] | ||
Cyber deception technology is a part of the process of identifying and responding to incidents. This technology helps the security team identify and analyze advanced threats by persuading an attacker to strike fake resources. The deception approach is to create a high-precision warning about high-risk behaviors. Deception occurs in a variety of ways, including an active defense approach. Active defense is an approach that is based on the establishment of measures to detect, analyze, identify and reduce threats to communication systems and networks in real time by default, which ultimately leads to cyber security. To better understand the techniques used in active defense, we can mention the Honeypot. The Honeypot is a trick that is deliberately placed on the net to be explored by an attacker in order to record, track and analyze the activities performed. In this project, we have used a low-interaction Honeypot to identify malicious activities. Using these technologies and strategies, we have designed an active cyber defense system (SDF). Taking into account the IP, this system has the capability of monitoring and real-time detection of abnormalities that occur in the form of functional level of attackers. Both the cyber deception and the honeypot concentrate on trapping the attacker by misleading, confusing, and etc. But active cyber deception (SDF) technology is an evolution of Honeypot, extending its limited capabilities. | ||
کلیدواژهها [English] | ||
Honeypot, cyber deception, active cyber defense, low interaction | ||
مراجع | ||
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آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 705 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 293 |