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ارزیابی کاربردی حملات کانال جانبی مبتنی بر آسیب پذیری‌های پردازنده‌ها | ||
| پدافند الکترونیکی و سایبری | ||
| مقاله 9، دوره 12، شماره 3 - شماره پیاپی 47، آبان 1403، صفحه 101-118 اصل مقاله (1009.47 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| احمد قنادان زاده1؛ مهدی ملازاده* 2؛ علی مقدسی3؛ مهدی اصفهانی4 | ||
| 1دانشجوی دکتری، دانشگاه جامع امام حسین (ع)، تهران، ایران | ||
| 2استادیار، دانشگاه جامع امام حسین (ع)، تهران، ایران | ||
| 3استادیار، دانشگاه جامع امام حسین(ع)، تهران، ایران | ||
| 4پژوهشگر،دانشگاه صنعتی شریف، تهران، ایران | ||
| تاریخ دریافت: 09 مرداد 1403، تاریخ بازنگری: 28 شهریور 1403، تاریخ پذیرش: 23 مهر 1403 | ||
| چکیده | ||
| در سال های اخیر وسایل الکترونیکی هم‌چون لپ‌تاپ، کامپیوتر، تلفن‌های همراه هوشمند و دیگر وسایل الکترونیکی هوشمند به شدت افزایش یافته که تمام این وسایل الکترونیکی از یک یا چند پردازنده در داخل خود استفاده می نمایند که با توجه به نوع معماری هر پردازنده ممکن است آسیبپذیریهای متفاوتی داشته باشند. در این مقاله بررسی و ارزیابی آسیبپذیریهای کانال جانبی مبتنی بر آسیبپذیریهای پردازنده‌های اینتل و آرم بر اساس روش تحلیل سلسله مراتبی انجام شده است. حملات انجام شده بر اساس آسیبپذیریهای موجود به 6 دسته‌ی کلی تقسیم‌بندی شده است که بر اساس شاخص‌هایی چون زمان، امکانپذیری، اثربخشی و هزینه مورد ارزیابی قرار گرفته است. در بین 6 حمله‌ی بررسی شده، 3 حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان، حمله‌ی کانال جانبی توان با اندازه‌گیری نرم‌افزاری و حمله‌ی مبتنی بر حافظه‌ی نهان به ترتیب بیشترین امتیاز را براساس معیارهای ارزیابی به خود اختصاص داده اند و حمله‌ی کانال جانبی توان با اندازه‌گیری سخت‌افزاری کمترین امتیاز را داشته است که در اینجا نرخ ناسازگاری کلی برابر با مقدار 06/0 شده است که قابل قبول است. همچنین 3 زیر‌معیار درصد بازیابی کلید(گذرواژه)، سطح دسترسی و قابلیت ایجاد کانال پنهان بیشترین تاثیر را بر روی گزینه‌های تصمیم داشته اند. در نهایت این گزینه‌ها علاوه بر رتبه‌بندی کلی بر اساس هرکدام از معیارها نیز امتیازبندی شده‌اند. از منظر زمان حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان و حمله‌ی کانال جانبی توان با اندازه‌گیری سخت‌افزاری به ترتیب بیشترین و کمترین امتیاز و اولیویت را دارند و از منظر امکانپذیری حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان و حمله‌ی کانال جانبی توان با اندازه‌گیری نرم‌افزاری به ترتیب دارای بیشترین و کمترین اولویت هستند. همچنین از منظر اثربخشی حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان و حمله‌ی کانال جانبی توان با اندازه‌گیری سخت‌افزاری به ترتیب اولویت بیشتر و کمتری داشته و از منظر هزینه نیز حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان و حمله‌ی مبتنی بر ریزمعماری به ترتیب دارای بیشترین و کمترین امتیاز و اولویت شدند. در ادامه میزان خطر این 6 راهکار با استفاده از پارامتر CVSS امتیازدهی شده و رتبه‌بندی شد. نتایج این ارزیابی نشان می‌دهد که 3 حمله‌ی مبتنی بر زمان، حمله‌ی مبتنی بر ریزمعماری و حمله‌ی مبتنی بر حافظه‌ی نهان به ترتیب بیشتری خطر را برای قربانی داشته و بیشترین آسیب را وارد خواهند نمود. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| آسیب‌پذیری پردازنده‌ها؛ تحلیل سلسله مراتبی؛ حافظه‌ی نهان؛ ارزیابی خطر | ||
| موضوعات | ||
| سخت افزار | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Evaluation of Side-Channel Attacks for Different Types of Processors Vulnerabilities | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Ahmad GhannadanZadeh1؛ Mahdi Mollazadeh2؛ Ali Moghaddasi3؛ Mahdi Esfahani4 | ||
| 1PhD student, Imam Hossein University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Assistant Professor, Imam Hossein University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 3Assistant Professor, Imam Hossein University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 4Researcher, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| In recent years, electronic devices such as laptops, computers, smart mobile phones and other smart electronic devices have greatly increased, and all these electronic devices use one or more processors inside them, which according to the type of architecture of each processor may have different vulnerabilities. In this paper Investigation and evaluation of side channel vulnerabilities based on the vulnerabilities of Intel and ARM processors has been done based on the hierarchical analysis method. Based on the existing vulnerabilities, the attacks have been divided into 6 general categories, which have been evaluated based on indicators such as time, possibility, effectiveness, and cost. Among the 6 attacks investigated, 3 time-based attack, power side channel attack with software measurement and cache-based attack have respectively assigned the most points based on the evaluation criteria and the power side-channel with hardware measurement attack has the lowest score, where the overall mismatch rate is 0.06, which is acceptable. Also, 3 sub-criteria of key (password) recovery percentage, access level and covert channel ability have had the greatest impact on decision options. Finally, in addition to the overall ranking, these options are also scored based on each of the criteria. From the time point of view, the time-based attack and the power side channel attack with hardware measurement have the highest and the lowest priority, respectively, and from the possibility point of view, the time-based attack and the power side channel attack with software measurement have the highest and lowest priority, respectively. Also, from the effectiveness point of view, time-based attack and side-channel power attack with hardware measurement have higher and lower priority, respectively, and from the cost point of view, time-based attack and micro-architecture-based attack have the highest and lowest points and priority, respectively. Next, the risk level of these 6 strategies was scored and ranked using the CVSS parameter. The results of this evaluation show that 3 time-based attacks, micro-architecture-based attacks, and cache-based attacks, respectively, are more dangerous for the victim and will cause the most damage. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Processors Vulnerability, Hierarchical analysis, Cache, Risk Assessment | ||
| مراجع | ||
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آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 290 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 39 |
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